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Examining Copyright Exemptions for Web
Mashups in the International Context:
Applying American Constitutional
Considerations as Guideposts for the
TRIPS Three-Step Test
by JAMES DE LOS REYES*
We thus have a system of technology that invites our kids to be
creative. Yet a system of law that prevents them from creating
legally. The regulation of this creativity thus fails every
important standard of efficiency and justice.
-Lawrence Lessig'
Introduction
Over the past few years, a significant industry involving
established companies and start-ups has taken shape around the
production and use of web mashup2 websites that combine content
from multiple sources. This burgeoning web mashup industry is
unlikely to disappear because of the numerous potential benefits
provided to consumers. While the technology that powers web
* The author wishes to thank and acknowledge the following: Professor Dana
Beldiman for her support and patience, Kyong Kim, Josephine Mason, and Yumi Nam for
their endless encouragement and attention to detail, and his wife, for her devotion.
1. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE
HYBRID ECONOMY 266 (2008).
2. See Mashup Dashboard - Programmable Web, available at http://www.
programmableweb.com/mashups (last visited Apr.18 2010) (The Mashup Dashboard
currently lists 4739 different mashups on its site) [hereinafter Mashup Dashboard]; Larry
Clarkin & Josh Holmes, Enterprise Mashups, THE ARCHITECTURE J., MSDN
Architecture Center, available at http://msdn.microsoft.comlen-us/architecture/
bb906060.aspx (last visited Apr.18, 2010).
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mashups continues to evolve at a rapid pace', important concerns
regarding compliance with intellectual property laws have become
increasingly pervasive.' In particular, questions regarding possible
copyright infringement loom over this relatively new space. Such
debate can pit the copyright interests of original content providers
and rights-holders against the broader interests of web mashup
creators and consumers. These conflicts are not limited within the
United States, but can reach across national borders and implicate
different systems of copyright law worldwide.
Significant case law regarding web mashups, in both the domestic
and international context, remains almost nonexistent. Even those
who track the progress of web mashups have noted the curious lack of
litigation against web mashups, and attributed this dearth to a lack of
visibility or significance in the market.' However, a lack of known
litigation does not mean that there is no problem to address. Web
mashups are far from clandestine activity. Rather, they provide
services that often comprise part of our everyday routine.! These
circumstances allow us to consider whether the utility of web mashups
affords them an exemption from copyright claims, before any
significant litigation undermines their creation. In this note, I
examine whether such an exemption for web mashups is appropriate
under both the domestic and international context.
In Part I, I lay the groundwork for the discussion by offering a
working definition of web mashups and a brief explanation of the
current market. I also lay out the basic copyright infringement
concerns surrounding web mashups and the insufficiency of current
3. See Mashup Dashboard, supra note 2 (estimates that over sixty-two new mashups
have been created in the past thirty days); see also Mashup Dashboard, supra note 2, at
http://www.programmableweb.com/apis (estimating that ninety-seven new Application
Programming Interfaces ("APIs") have been added in the past thirty days).
4. Urs Gasser & John G. Palfrey Jr., Case Study: Mashups Interoperability and
elnnovation, 2007 BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & Soc'Y, HARV. L. SCH., UNIV. ST.
GALLEN 9, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1033232
[hereinafter Mashups Interoperability] ("[T]he system by which it has come to pass is
currently unstable, in the sense that a lawsuit or withdrawal of interoperable interfaces by
a key stakeholder could set back innovation considerably.").
5. See Hacker News, Ask HN: How Do Mashups Avoid Copyright Infringement
Lawsuits?, available at http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=411555 (last visited Apr. 18,
2010) (Ycombinator provides seed funding for startup companies. This website includes a
forum discussion thread noting a lack of litigation regarding mashups).
6. Id.
7. Gasser & Palfrey Jr., supra note 4, at 10; see, e.g., Yelp API Profile, available at
http://www.programmableweb.com/api/yelp/mashups (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (Yelp
API Profile lists numerous Yelp powered mashups that address common tasks).
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safeguards against infringement. Part II discusses values that underlie
the United States' copyright system and important constitutional
interests regarding freedom of expression. I will refer to these values
and interests later in the main analysis. In Part III, I provide a
general overview of the World Trade Organization's ("WTO")
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS") 8-important provisions which one might use to assert a
lawful limitation on the copyright interests of original content
creators-and the "Three-Step Test" used to analyze such claims. I
also address why TRIPS and the Three-Step Test are proper vehicles
for examining web mashups, and introduce two important WTO
panel reports which will serve as reference points for the forthcoming
analysis.
Part IV contains the three-step inquiry itself, where I analyze the
possibility of creating an exemption to copyright liability for web
mashups under Article 13 of the TRIPS agreement. I analogize and
contrast some of the previous limitation claims made under Article 13
and Article 30 of TRIPS, and work through each prong of the Three-
Step Test to determine whether such an exception is appropriate in
the web mashup context.
While I offer historical accounts of previous attempts to use the
three-step test as points of reference, I argue that the three-step test
should not be interpreted using a strict textual interpretation of
TRIPS provisions, as has been done in the past. Rather, because
TRIPS itself allows-and calls for-a balancing of interests,9 the
proper framework is to account for societal interests besides those of
the rights-holders. In particular, the societal interests in promoting
expression, debate, and a vibrant public domain that apply in the
United States context are also applicable in the international context.
Finally, I conclude with a brief recap of the three-step analysis for
web mashups.
8. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS].
9. Christophe Geiger et al., Declaration: A Balanced Interpretation of the 'Three-Step
Test' in Copyright Law, 39 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 707, 708 (2008).
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I. Web Mashups
A. Definition of a 'Mashup'
The term "mashup" can have various meanings, depending on
the context. For example, a mashup can refer to a musical or
audiovisual work "that consists entirely of parts of other songs or
videos."'o Examples involve song remixes and YouTube videos,
which blend various media and content." Any mashup can also be
called a "remix," or recombination of elements from other media into
a new creative work. 2 For this inquiry, I will focus primarily on "web
mashups," which combine data "from two or more Web applications
to create an integrated experience informed by the original data
sources." 3  Such web pages are increasingly common and
encountered quite frequently. 4 Of particular interest are the results
pages generated by newer mashup-based search engines, which
attempt to surface more relevant content in response to web
consumers' inquiries."
Just as web mashups can vary in their form and content, so can
their creators. Web mashup developers that engage in remixing can
consist of "professional" companies or businesses, such as movie
studios or recording companies." However, web mashups are
increasingly created by "amateur" end-users and consumers that
receive content before manipulating it into new works." The works
created by this latter class of amateur web mashup creators are often
referred to as "user-generated content" ("UGC"). While this
distinction is important, I will generally refer to all web mashup
creators as part of a single class for this paper.
10. WGBH Educational Foundation, Open Content and Public Broadcasting Report:
Glossary, http://opencontent.wgbh.org/report/glossary.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
11. See LESSIG, supra note 1, at 1-2.
12. Id. at 69.
13. Gasser & Palfrey Jr., supra note 4, at 2.
14. See Mashup Dashboard, supra note 2 (estimating that over sixty-two new
mashups have been created in the past thirty days).
15. See, e.g., Kosmix.com, http://www.kosmix.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2010); Google
Maps, http://maps.google.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2010); Yahoo Pipes,
http://pipes.yahoo.com/pipes/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2010); see Programmable Web, http://
www.programmableweb.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2010) (additional mashup examples).
16. Mary W. S. Wong, 'Transformative' User-Generated Content in Copyright Law:
Infringing Derivative Works or Fair Use?, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1075, 1077-78
(2009).
17. Id.
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For purposes of this discussion, I will focus on external,
consumer facing web mashups rather than those that remain internal
to a company. I also make the assumption that web mashup creators
are using data that they did not create or originally own. Thus, an
enterprise may choose to create a strictly internal web mashup for its
employees, and only use the information it can claim to have rights
to." Such a web mashup does not concern this inquiry because there
are fewer concerns about copyright infringement in such a context.
B. The Web Mashup 'Market' and Value for Web Mashup Consumers
Besides offering a definition of web mashups, it makes sense to
provide an overview of the web mashup market so we can understand
the scope and context of the problem. Today's web mashups support
varying business models and practices. First, existing companies can
incorporate web mashups to improve or complement their existing
business model. Such companies can choose to use web mashups for
external or internal purposes.1 9 Second, a web mashup itself can serve
as the main service or product for a new company or start-up.20
Indeed, numerous start-ups are attempting to use web mashups in
pay-per-use, subscription, or ad-funded revenue models.21 Third, web
mashups also have noncommercial applications and can support
public service or nonprofit goals. 22 The first two models are typically
considered commercial ventures, done for profit. Web mashups in
the third category can be considered "sharing economies" which
focus on conveying information, encouraging exchange, dialogue, or
contribution.23 While no hard distinction exists between commercial
and sharing economies, monetary profit is usually not the primary
motivator in a sharing economy. 24  However, newer "hybrid
economies" which blend aspects of commercial and sharing
economies can also exist.25 Such hybrid companies, including web
mashups, may still wish to foster collaboration and exchange among a
community while still seeking to profit from the transactions. 26 Taken
18. Clarkin & Holmes, supra note 2.




23. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 148.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 228.
26. Id.
477
as a whole, the web mashup market seems to be part of a formidable
market. A recent Business Wire study suggests that the enterprise
web mashup market was worth around $161 million in 2008, and is
forecasted to grow to $1.74 billion by 2013.27
Whatever their form, web mashups benefit their users by
presenting information in ways that have more meaning for the user.2
However, such benefits do not come without legal costs.
C. Potential Copyright Infringement Via Web Mashup Creation
As seen above, web mashups represent an increasingly promising
market and result in greater benefits for their users and community
members, but also face an increasing and corresponding risk of
possible copyright infringement violations. Companies and
individuals often create web mashups using other parties' information
without first seeking permission, and then present it in ways the
original rights-holders may not have intended.29  These actions
implicate copyright infringement concerns, either as a form of direct
infringement or secondary liability.30 For purposes of this discussion,
it suffices to assert that copyright concerns are implicated. Web
mashups also present a particularly interesting scenario because of
the sheer amount of information they are capable of processing and
presenting. Further, it is increasingly likely that web mashup pages
27. Reportlinker Adds the Future of Enterprise Mashups: Demand, Challenges and
Vendor Opportunities, BUSINESS WIRE, Sept. 21, 2009, available at http://www.
businesswire.com/portal/site/google/?ndmViewd=newsview&newsld=20090921005858&
newsLang=en (summary includes a study on enterprise web mashups).
28. Clarkin & Holmes, supra note 2.
29. Robert D. Hof, Mix, Match, and Mutate, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, July 25, 2005,
available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_30/b3944108_mz063.htm
(last visited Sept. 25, 2010).
30. While I do not undertake a detailed analysis of which form of copyright
infringement may be committed by a mashup, a brief discussion is in order. If a mashup
creator gains access to copyrighted material through screenscraping or an API without the
copyright owner's permission, the mashup creator may commit direct infringement if it
reproduces, displays, or distributes the copyright content of others. A mashup creator
may also violate the copyright owner's right to create derivative works by presenting the
content in a different context than the copyright owner intended.
Meanwhile, a mashup creator may also commit indirect infringement. The mashup
creator could be accused of vicarious liability because it has the ability to control the
infringing conduct and arguably has a direct financial interest in the infringing activity.
Further, if a mashup creator facilitates or allows the consumer to further edit or change
the content, that act could be viewed as contributory liability if the mashup creator
facilitated the further infringement and provided the means allowing for the infringement.
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will reach an international audience, or will utilize information
coming from international sources.
Scholars and intellectual property ("IP") attorneys agree that
web mashups create uncertainty regarding existing IP laws. One
professor notes that web mashups create a gray area between the
rights-holder's original material and the composite web mashup
product." Similarly, the lack of meaningful court litigation regarding
web mashups also means that the consequences of sampling
copyrighted materials for web mashups remain unpredictable.32
However, one notable IP attorney posits that commercial or
promotional work may be harder to defend from potential lawsuits."
From a technical standpoint, many web mashups utilize
Application Programming Interfaces ("API") from other companies
to access the information that will get incorporated into the web
mashup page.34 Web mashup creators usually require a license from
the API's provider to gain access to an API. Such licensing
agreements may help prevent copyright infringement because the
provider retains control of the API and can take down the API if it
chooses." For this reason, some argue that web mashups should be
exempt from secondary infringement liability because the content
provider has full control over the API.
However, API licensing may create greater risks for copyright
infringement instead of providing copyright protection. Even if
content providers allow web mashup developers to use an API, it is
quite possible that someone else's copyrighted information is
included in that data and is subject to misuse.
31. Victoria Ho, Mashups changing the face of copyright laws, ZDNET ASIA, Jan. 8,
2009, available at http://www.zdnetasia.com/mashups-changing-the-face-of-copyright-laws-
62049904.htm.
32. Alexandra Wharton, Getting Into the Mashup Mix, MTHINK, Sept. 1, 2007,
available at http://www.mthink.com/affiliate-performance-marketing/getting-mashup-mix.
33. Id.
34. Gasser & Palfrey Jr., supra note 4, at 3.
35. Lisa Veasman, 'Piggy Backing' on the Web 2.0 Internet: Copyright Liability and
Web 2.0 Mashups, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 311,315 (2008).
36. Id. at 330.
37. Id. at 326-33.
38. Gasser & Palfrey Jr., supra note 4, at 21 (The authors go on to offer an example,
explaining that "[A]mazon and Google book searching APIs reveal information about
copyrighted books, and the authors of those books might have colorable copyright claims
against those who make mashups with that information, depending on what portions of
the books are accessible through the APIs.").
479
Web mashup creators may also gain access to desired content
without going through a company's API. Less sanctioned methods
such as "screenscraping" (in which a computer program extracts
information from human-readable website content) can also be used
to procure copyrighted information. 9  Thus, whether APIs or
screenscraping methods are used to access information, a web
mashup can be created without the rights-holder's express
permission.
D. Deficiencies and Concerns with Current Copyright Protections
Many web mashup developers recognize that they do not operate
in a vacuum, and have tried to establish common industry practices
regarding the creation of web mashup pages. In the spirit of
cooperation, many web mashup creators and content providers have
tried to set terms of use through contract formation, licensing
agreements, or by establishing social norms.' However, each
approach has limited effectiveness, especially in a web mashup space
that offers little settled law for guidance and was likened to "the wild
west all over again."41
Social norms in the web mashup space dictate that companies
and users remain committed to sharing information and keeping their
APIs open for use by others.42 However, this approach seems to offer
little solace for content providers who may fear stigmatization and a
public relations backlash if they attempted to restrict access to their
APIs.4 ' Rather than offer a principled reason for content providers to
make their APIs available, this approach merely seems to scare
providers into complying with social norms.
While it makes sense for web mashup creators and content
providers to form contracts or licensing agreements with each other,
the resulting morass can become quite complex and pose potential
problems." Web mashup creators will often need to form several
contracts with numerous content providers to integrate various types
of information into their product. 45 These contracts may have vague
39. Web Scraping, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilWeb-scraping (last visited
Apr. 10, 2010).
40. Gasser & Palfrey Jr., supra note 4, at 19-21.
41. Hof, supra note 29.
42. Gasser & Palfrey Jr., supra note 4, at 19.
43. Id.
44. Gasser & Palfrey Jr., supra note 4, at 19-20.
45. Id. at 20.
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or conflicting terms of service between data sources.' Similarly, web
mashup creators that try to procure licenses from other content
providers may find those licenses incompatible with the usage
contemplated for the intended web mashup product.47  In turn,
ambiguous contracts, licenses, or the threat of litigation over such
agreements can chill any potential innovations or web mashup
products. 48
Indeed, content providers often use copyright claims to limit
consumers to acting as end-users,49 instead of amateur creators of new
content. One prominent example includes the use of Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") "takedown" provisions,
(Section 512 of the Copyright Act), which offer Internet Service
Providers ("ISPs") safe harbor from copyright infringement claims if
they promptly remove infringing content after being notified.so As a
senior IP attorney for the Electronic Frontier Foundation notes,
copyright owners can use the DMCA to pressure website owners into
removing online content-even when it does not infringe upon any
existing copyrights."' Similarly, content providers may threaten web
mashup creators with possible legal action if they do not comply with
takedown requests. Such tactics are unfair because content providers
52
can misuse the DMCA for censorship purposes.
The flaw with current safeguards is that they offer too much
control for one side or the other. Social norms can coerce content
providers into keeping their APIs open while they may have
legitimate concerns over copyright infringement. Meanwhile,
contracts and licensing agreements are difficult to implement and may
afford too much censorship power to content providers. A more
principled balancing of interests between rights-holders and web
mashup creators needs to be struck.
The current situation leaves interested parties unsure of their
rights in the internet context. To properly consider the interests of
content providers and web mashup creators, we require a clearer
understanding of copyright law's objectives.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 21.
48. Id.
49. Daniel J. Gervais, Towards a New Core International Copyright Norm: The
Reverse Three-Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005).
50. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
51. Wharton, supra note 32.
52. Id.
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II. Reconciling U.S. Copyright Values and
Constitutional Free Speech Interests
It may be helpful to view American copyright law and the United
States Constitution as two sets of interests that should considered
when examining a workable solution regarding web mashups.
Indeed, "scholars are focusing more attention on the interaction
between intellectual property, internet regulation and the
Constitution than ever before."" This interplay is also beneficial
when considering web mashups within both a domestic and
international context.
A. The Default View of American Copyright Law - A Utilitarian and
Economic Rationale
The United States Constitution gives Congress the enumerated
power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."5 This
Intellectual Property Clause serves as the foundation for the United
States' system of copyright and patent law by giving Congress the
power to pass copyright legislation." The clause essentially serves a
utilitarian public purpose of advancing knowledge and learning." To
that end, the United States Supreme Court stated that copyright's
primary goal is to promote public access to knowledge." Granting
protections to authors and inventors is a means to these ends, and not
the primary goal in itself. The United States places emphasis on
maintaining a vibrant public domain.
The American copyright system and its utilitarian underpinnings
are predicated largely on economic considerations. Under this view,
American copyright law continually tries to balance competing
interests. The American copyright system accords copyright
protections to authors so they can recoup their investment in their
53. Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionalization of Technology Law, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 529,529 (2000).
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
55. JULIE COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 3-4
(2d ed. 2006).
56. Id. at 21-22 (noting that "Science" in the Intellectual Property Clause referred to
knowledge and learning during that era).
57. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(promoting public access to knowledge as principal purpose of copyright).
58. Wong, supra note 16, at 1082-83.
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creative works." This, in turn, gives the authors an economic
incentive to keep creating new worksW
On the other hand, copyright law must also limit authors' rights
in order to maintain a vibrant public domain so others can create
their own works. Authors create new works by drawing from other
pre-existing works and their own experiences." Allowing them to
have absolute rights over their work would hinder overall progress by
limiting the number of works that subsequent authors could draw
upon. Thus, American copyright law tries to define the proper level
of rights protection to provide effective copyright enforcement while
still optimizing authors' contributions to society and the public
domain.
On balance, this utilitarian view of our domestic copyright
system would likely constrain the development of web mashups,
because copyright law would prevent web mashup creators from
infringing upon the content-owners' exclusive right to make
derivative works.
B. Reconciling U.S. Copyright Law with U.S. Constitutional Free
Expression and First Amendment Considerations
As discussed above, the American copyright system serves a
practical utilitarian purpose of maximizing authors' contributions to
society. However, some scholars now argue that copyright law should
look beyond utilitarian and economic considerations.62 Copyright law
should also account for notions of social justice, the public interest,
free speech, and democratic values," which are often viewed in
relation to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
This convergence of multiple interests does not mean that copyright
law and the First Amendment necessarily complement each other.
Indeed, the two can often conflict.
On a basic level, the First Amendment upholds free speech,
while copyright law grants authors proprietary rights in their works,
including the right to exclude others from using protected content.6
59. COHEN ET AL., supra note 55, at 7.
60. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
("lBly establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies
the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.").
61. Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966-67 (1990).
62. Wong, supra note 16, at 1082.
63. Id.
64. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the
Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 227 (1998).
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However, by forcing copyright law to account for free speech, social
values, and democratic ideals, we can imagine a system of copyright
law that can operate in a manner consistent with those values. In this
way, free speech and democratic values also serve as valuable
limitations and exceptions that help prevent overzealous copyright
enforcement.
Meanwhile, Internet technologies, such as web mashups, have
also challenged the idea "that utilitarian theory is the foundation of
our current copyright system."" With this in mind, we can examine
how web mashups might complement and promote the values and
objectives of both free speech and our newly conceived notion of
copyright law.
1. Web Mashups Promote a New Form of Expression and Are
Consistent with Free Speech Interests.
Web mashups and internet technology gives companies and users
the ability to "harness the enormous capabilities of the Internet to
access, use, and disseminate information and content."" In addition,
many users are creating remixes and web mashups to comment,
critique, and discuss valuable ideas with each other. In so doing, they
are also forming relationships and associations with one another.
They are expressing vital connections both to popular cultural
expressions and also to others who share their passions.67 Thus, this
"new generation of digital natives is manipulating content online as a
form of expression .... " This particular use of the Internet has also
helped spawn a remix culture, where people are not passive recipients
but active creators.6 This further comports with the assertion that
digital media has become a crucial new expressive medium for society
and digital forms of communication may be crucial in "enabl[ing]
individuals to participate in the intellectual life of society. . . ."'0
Access to information could also help "reduce the danger of a 'digital
65. Wong, supra note 16, at 1082.
66. Gervais, supra note 49, at 6.
67. Pat Aufderheide et. al., Recut, Reframe, Recycle: Quoting Copyrighted Material in
User-Generated Video, 9 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP. CYBER TECH & E-COM. 37 (2008)
[hereinafter Aufderheide].
68. Ho, supra note 31.
69. Id.
70. MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP TEST:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE THREE STEP TEST IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC COPYRIGHT LAW
31 (2004).
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divide' of society.",7 Viewed in this light, web mashups serve a crucial
role in encouraging democratic participation and furthering freedom
of expression. Thus, web mashups can promote free speech and
democratic values.
2. Web Mashups Promote a Vibrant Public Domain and Are Consistent
with Copyright Law's Revised Objectives.
Meanwhile, web mashups can also serve copyright's revised
objective of promoting a vibrant public domain while still promoting
free speech and democratic objectives. The lack of a vibrant public
domain will result in "a society in which people are free to speak ...
only insofar as they own the intellectual components of their
communication." 72 This scenario runs counter to the objectives of
copyright, and suggests that copyright protections for rights-holders
should not be so strong that they impede people's ability to speak.
However, as noted above, web mashups provide people with "a
wider set of tools to express ideas and emotions differently." 73
Beyond that, web mashup creators can "see themselves as producers
and participants in a culture, and not just recipients of it."74 In so
doing, web mashups allow their makers to express thereby a zest for
participation in culture-making.5  This interchange and sharing
among members of a larger community can have positive effects on
the public domain by allowing users to make full use of internet
technology to be more creative and actively collaborate with others. 6
The internet and web mashups can ultimately spur the creation of
new works and thereby promote the goal of the copyright system.
Thus, the goals of copyright law can be achieved without conflicting
with important free speech and democratic values. These values can
also serve as valuable guideposts when we look at web mashups in the
international context.
71. Id.
72. Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 358 (1999).
73. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 83.
74. Id. at 80.
75. Aufderheide, supra note 67.
76. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 294.
485
I. The Trips Agreement and the Three-Step Test:
A Framework for Analysis of Web
Given that web mashup creators, as well as the content they use
for their creations, come from multiple countries," this analysis
should invoke more than American copyright law. The United States
has joined various international intellectual property agreements to
have a voice in global copyright discussions and policies. These
treaties and conventions include the global intellectual property
treaty, TRIPS.
The TRIPS protocol comprises seventy-three articles on a broad
range of subjects, whose overall objectives are to "contribute to the
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers
and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to
social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and
obligations.",8  Further, the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health emphasized that "each provision of the TRIPS
Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the
Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and
principles."' 9
TRIPS was written to facilitate and promote international
trade' Thus, like American copyright law, TRIPS is traditionally
viewed according to utilitarian considerations and economic
copyright rationales." However, just as American copyright law
should account for noneconomic factors including speech and free
expression, TRIPS should also take similar issues and interests into
consideration. This is especially true in light of its acknowledgment
of social welfare and other obligations mentioned above.8
77. International workshops are held in various international cities, including Sydney
and Vienna, indicating that web mashup creators come from multiple countries. See
generally, Mashups '09 3rd Int'l Workshop on Web APIs and Servs. Mashups at OOPSLA
(2009), http://www.mashup-oopsla.org/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Mashup
'09].
78. TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 7.
79. Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HoUs. L.
REV. 979, 996 (2009) (citing World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter
Doha Declaration]).
80. SENFTLEBEN, supra note 70, at 17.
81. Id.
82. See supra text accompanying note 78.
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Similar to United States copyright law, it is unlikely that TRIPS
was crafted with web mashups in mind. Rather, TRIPS was created
for "an era that largely predated Internet commerce in trademarked
goods, distribution of digitized copyrighted materials, and the
informatics revolution within the patent industries."3 In the internet
age, TRIPS provisions should be interpreted with some flexibility.
A. The Three-Step Test
Just as domestic copyright law allows for exceptions and
limitation upon authors' copyright protections, the three-step test
provides a framework for evaluating similar copyright exceptions
under TRIPS. In plain language, the three-step test permits
limitations on rights-holders' intellectual property rights: 1) in certain
special cases 2) that do not conflict with the normal commercial
exploitation of the work and 3) do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the author.' The test is now the definitive
inquiry for deciding almost all limitations or exceptions for
international intellectual property rights claims." Within TRIPS, the
three-step test is codified for copyright rights in Article 13 and for
patent rights in Article 30.86
Previous interpretations of the three-step test have required all
three factors to be satisfied before a limitation or exception could
issue. Under this reading, a proposed limitation or exemption fails if
one of the prongs is not met." While this reasoning was adopted in
both of the prominent TRIPS cases,89 significant controversy exists
regarding whether the three prongs should be viewed as part of a
comprehensive, overall assessment, despite the fragmented
application suggested by the test's name."
83. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Designing a Global Intellectual
Property System Responsive to Change: The WTO, WIPO, and Beyond, 46 HOUS. L. REV.
1188,1189 (2009).
84. Gervais, supra note 49, at 13 (referring to the basic components of the three step
test prior to their interpretation in several TRIPS provisions).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Kamiel J. Koelman, Opinion, Fixing the Three-Step Test, EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV., 407-12 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=924174.
88. Id.
89. Geiger et al., supra note 9, at 709 n.1 (describing how the WTO-Panel reports for
WT/DS1141R and WT/DS160/R, promote or do not contest the view that all three prongs
of the three-step test must be satisfied for a limitation to issue).
90. Id.
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Numerous European scholars argue that the three factors should
be weighed together when considering a potential limitation." They
advocate for this approach because it allows adjudicating parties
more discretion to fully consider relevant interests and circumstances
in a case.92  This extra discretion makes practical sense when
considering web mashups, especially since "[a]nalogue-era exceptions
to copyright do not apply easily to the Internet environment." 93
Finally, nothing in the present versions of the three-step test
precludes the weighing of all three factors as part of an overall
assessment.' Given the novelty of the argument concerning web
mashups, the more flexible reading of the test should apply.
B. Previous Applications of the Three-Step Test in TRIPS
There have only been three dispute resolution panels, or "cases,"
that have been brought under TRIPS provisions regarding limitations
on intellectual property rights. While their facts bear little
resemblance to our web mashups scenario, the holdings for two of
those cases are instructive guideposts for our analysis and warrant a
brief introduction here.
The only case invoking TRIPS' three-step test for copyright
limitations involves a claim brought by the European Community
("EC") against the United States to challenge Section 110(5) of the
United States Copyright Act.' Section 110(5) allowed public bars,
clubs, and restaurants to play copyrighted radio and television
broadcasts inside their establishments without paying royalty fees,
under certain circumstances." In a proceeding before the WTO's
dispute settlement body ("DSB"), the EC argued that both
exemptions under Section 110(5)(A) and 110(5)(B) violated the
United States' obligations under the TRIPS agreement.f The United
States asserted that both section 110(5)(A) and 110(5)(B) were
91. Id. at 4.
92. Koelman, supra note 87, at 411.
93. Gervais, supra note 49, at 25.
94. Geiger et al., supra note 9, at 708.
95. Panel Report, United States - Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act, 1 1.1,
WT/DS160/R (Jun. 15, 2000) [hereinafter 110(5) Report].
96. Id. at 1 2.3.
97. Section 110(5)(A), termed the "homestyle" exception, allowed for the public
display or performance of a -work in public as long as the establishment only used
equipment commonly used in private homes. Section 110(5)(B) allowed for the display of
nondramatic musical works in public establishments, using more sophisticated equipment.
Id. at 2.3, 1 3.3.
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permissible exceptions under Article 13 of TRIPS. The DSB panel
applied the three-step test in Article 13 and held that Section
110(5)(B) violated TRIPS because the exemption did not satisfy any
of the prongs of the three-step test." However, the DSB concluded
that the "homestyle" exception in Section 110(5)(A) met the
requirements of Article 13 and did not violate TRIPS."
In the second test case, the WTO's DSB applied another three-
step analysis in a patent rights context& There, the EC asserted that
two sections of Canada's patent act for pharmaceuticals violated
Canada's obligations under TRIPS.101 Similar to the United States'
contentions in the 110(5) Report, Canada asserted that its legislation
was a limited exception for patent rights that satisfied the three step
test embodied in Article 30 of TRIPS.1m After extensive application
of the Article 30 three-step test, the DSB concluded that one section
of Canada's patent legislation remained in compliance with TRIPS
while the other violated Article 30 and was not a limited exception."3
IV. Applying the Three-Step Test to Web Mashups
Article 13 of TRIPS allows for possible limitations upon
copyright interests of rights-holders and states: "Members shall
confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special
cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work
and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right
holder."'" Thus, any copyright exception for web mashups would
need to remain consistent with this language. Though Article 13
contains all the factors from the three-step test and is only a single
sentence, it contains several ambiguous terms that will require further
examination.
98. COHEN ET AL., supra note 55, at 471.
99. Id.
100. Panel Report, Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 1 1.1, 7-8
1 3.1,WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Patent Report].
101. Id.
102. Id. at 8 1 3.2(a) (the first factor of the three-step test in Article 30 calls for a
"limited exception" to patent right protections, while Article 13 considers whether a
copyright limitation falls into the category of "certain special cases.").
103. Patent Report, supra note 100, 7.36, 174 8.1 at 156.
104. TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 13.
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A. Confinement of Exceptions to 'Certain Special Cases'
This first prong asks, "How does one define a special case?" In
the 110(5) Report, the United States argued that Article 13 offered
no definition of "special case" and that the exception only needed to
be "well-defined and of limited application."o' The United States
further asserted that the Section 110(5)(B) exception was narrowly
written to apply under very specific conditions.'6 For its part, the EC
focused on the sheer size of the exception and argued that the
exception in Section 110(5)(B) would unconditionally exempt "73 per
cent of all drinking establishments, 70 per cent of all eating
establishments and 45 per cent of all retail establishments."" Such an
exemption, the EC contended, would turn a limited exception into
the accepted rule." The DSB panel found the EC's figures
compelling, and decided that the limitation exempted too many users
to be considered a "special case."109
A similar argument could be leveled against web mashups since
the potential market for this developing technology appears
promising."o As with the 110(5) Panel, it would be difficult to argue
that an emerging industry worth potentially billions of dollars would
qualify as a "special case," even if the exception was narrowly written.
Viewed as a whole, a proposed copyright limitation for all web
mashups would likely fail the first factor of the three-step test.
However, the 110(5) panel also found that the 110(5)(A)
exception to be a permissible "special case" exception because it
exempted a comparatively smaller percentage of establishments and
mainly applied to small "mom and pop" stores."' A similar
distinction could be drawn between web mashups created by end
users or amateurs, and those created by more sophisticated
commercial entities. As with the 110(5)(A) exception, the United
States could assert that amateur web mashups would have less
impact. This differentiation would not help larger commercial
ventures like Yelp or Google, but would make a partial exemption for
individuals more likely.
105. 110(5) Report, supra note 95, 6.103 at 32.
106. Id. 6.114 at 34.
107. Id. 6.237 at 61.
108. 110(5) Report, supra note 95, at 1 6.103.
109. Id. at% 6.131 at 61.
110. See supra text accompanying note 24.
111. 110(5) Report, supra note 95, 6.142, 42 6.156 at 61.
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If the United States still wished to assert a copyright limitation
for all web mashups, it would have to argue by analogy to the "limited
exception" language in the Article 30 three-step test. In the Patent
Report, Canada argued that one of its proposed exceptions was
limited to the last six months of a relevant patent.'12 Similarly, the
United States would have to settle on a copyright limitation for web
mashups that would be restricted in either duration or scope.
However, this argument failed to convince the Patent Report Panel,
and may not work in the web mashup context."'
Thus, both three-step cases suggest that web mashups would fail
the first factor of the test. However, the other factors of the three-
step test should be examined before rendering any final judgment on
possible exceptions for web mashups.
B. Conflict with a Normal Exploitation of the Work
The second prong regards economic concerns, and examines
whether the proposed exception would hinder the rights-holder's
ability to profit from his work in their accustomed markets."4 Thus, a
possible copyright exception would fail the second factor if it is used
to limit a commercially significant market or, to enter into
competition with the copyright holder."s
In the 110(5) Report, the DSB noted that the affected rights-
holders of musical works would expect to receive royalties from the
broadcasts in eating and retail establishments. 6 There, the Panel
easily concluded that the Section 110(5)(B) exemption conflicted with
the rights-holders' normal exploitation of those works. Given the
web mashup market as a whole,"' it would be difficult to convince a
DSB panel that the economic interests of the rights-holder would be
served by a limitation on their copyright protections.
However, the outcome in the 110(5) Report does not translate
readily to the web mashup scenario. Unlike the broadcasts in the
110(5) Report, web mashups could be a newer form of expression
112. Patent Report, supra note 100, $ 4.14 at 61.
113. Canada's argument for a limitation comports better with the exclusivity
requirements for patents, and may be less applicable to copyright law situations in general.
However, the example demonstrates that a more restricted exemption may increase its
chances of satisfying the first factor of the three-step test.
114. Gervais, supra note 49, at 16.
115. Id. at 16-17.
116. 110(5) Report, supra note 95, T 6.210 at 61.
117. See supra text at accompanying note 24.
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that a rights-holder may not have anticipated. Thus, an internet
content provider may not be able to claim that he would expect
compensation from a new form of expression. In this regard, the
previous DSB panels did not address whether "normal exploitation"
covers potential markets which are not currently claimed by the
rights-holder, but may acquire considerable market importance in the
future."
The answer to this question is significant for web mashups and
other emerging forms of digital expression. If "normal exploitation"
includes all forms of exploiting a work which are likely to acquire
considerable economic or practical importance,"' a rights-holder
could claim that any new form of expression will conflict with his
ability to exploit his work.
This approach would provide too much control for rights-holders
in the internet context. Given current digital technology, "normal
exploitation" could encompass "nearly all ways of using and enjoying
works of the intellect."120 The second prong of the three-step test
might become insurmountable because an author could veto any
digital form of expressionl2 and render the exception clause of Article
13 meaningless.12  Thus, "normal exploitation" of a work must mean
something less than full use of an exclusive right.23
However, a rights-holder is not powerless in this situation. Many
internet content providers are now aware of web mashups and can
reasonably claim to expect payment if their work appears in that
medium. Even if this were not the case, the 110(5) Report asserts
that a right to exploit works of economic or practical importance
"must in principle be reserved to the authors."124 A senior IP attorney
at Google recently argued that rights-holders should embrace new
forms of exploitation and benefit from new markets that might come
118. In the 110(5) Report, the DSB panel equivocates, stating that it will consider "the
actual and potential effects of the exemptions in question in the current market and
technological environment." See 110(5) Report, supra note 95, 6.187 at 50.
119. Jane C. Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO Panel
Decision and the 'Three-Step Test' for Copyright Exceptions, 187 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 7 (2001) (Fr.).
120. SENFTLEBEN, supra note 70, at 181.
121. Id.
122. 110(5) Report, supra note 95, at 16.167, at 44.
123. Id.
124. Id. at $6.181.
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along.125 He notes that a new market "may be one that you didn't
control in the same way that you did before, but that in the end, was a
market that would give you new sources of revenue." 26 This
reasoning suggests that rights-holders should have the chance to
expand into emerging markets for their material, as a practical
matter. In this case, a limitation upon the rights-holder's copyright
protections could indeed conflict with normal exploitation of the
work.
Meanwhile, the 110(5) Report suggests that, "exceptions or
limitations would be presumed not to conflict with a normal
exploitation of works if they are confined to a scope or degree that
does not enter into economic competition with nonexempted uses."1 27
This suggests that web mashups with little commercial value should
be eligible for an Article 13 exemption because they would not
conflict much with the rights-holder's normal exploitation of his
material. As with the first factor of the test, noncommercial web
mashups correlate strongly with amateur web mashup creators, 128 and
are most likely to be granted a copyright exemption under Article 13.
However, the overall impact of this second factor on web
mashups is unclear. The 110(5) Report remains ambivalent about
how much control to accord rights-holders regarding the normal
exploitation of their work. Rights-holders should not have absolute
control. However, they should be rewarded for embracing new
markets and opportunities.
C. Whether a Limitation Unreasonably Prejudices the Legitimate
Interests of the Copyright Owner
This final factor of Article 13 may be the most important
component of the three-step test.129 The third factor states that any
proposed limitations on copyright protections must "not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights-
holder."O As its wording suggests, some prejudice to a rights-
125. Intellectual Property Watch, William Patry of Google, VIMEO, http://vimeo.com
/10088856 (last updated Mar. 11, 2010) (discussing his new book, Moral Panics and the
Copyright Wars in Geneva).
126. Id.
127. 110(5) Report, supra note 95, at 1 6.181.
128. See LESSIG, supra note 1, at 254-56.
129. SENFTLEBEN, supra note 70, at 287.
130. TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 13.
493
holder's interests is permitted. Only an unreasonable amount of
prejudice will not be tolerated.3 1
In the 110(5) Report, the DSB asserted that threshold is reached
if an exception or limitation could cause an unreasonable loss of
income to the copyright owner.132 The Panel later found that the
United States failed to show that the Section 110(5)(B) exception
would avoid such an unreasonable loss to the rights-holder.'
Conversely, the panel held that it lacked sufficient information to
show an unreasonable loss to under the Section 110(5)(A) homestyle
exception.'34 Using this information, one might argue that web
mashups would likely fail this prong in the analysis.
However, applying the same reasoning from the 110(5) Report to
this situation would yield an incorrect analysis for this third factor of
the test. First, the 110(5) Report panel failed to construe Article 13 in
accordance with TRIPS' objectives and must therefore consider the
interests of other parties. Second, the 110(5) Report Panel only
examined the copyright owner's economic losses without considering
important policy issues and societal interests, as TRIPS requires.
These errors could result in a lopsided balancing of interests in our
web mashup scenario if they remain unaddressed.
1. TRIPS Requires Us to Consider the Interests of Third Parties When
Applying the Article 13 Three-Step Test.
Though the language of Article 13 only mentions the legitimate
interests of the copyright owner and says nothing about the interests
of third parties, the Doha Declaration reminds us that we should view
TRIPS provisions in relation to the overall objectives of the TRIPS
agreement, as laid out in Article 7.135 Indeed, Article 7 discusses
"mutual advantage of producers and users ... social and economic
welfare . . . and a balance of rights and obligations."136 Taken in
context, this language strongly indicates that Article 13 should
consider more than the rights-holder's concerns.
Moreover, the wording of Article 13 suggests that the interests of
third parties must be considered. The third prong's focus on the
legitimacy of interests and reasonableness of prejudices against the
131. SENFTLEBEN, supra note 70, at 226.
132. 110(5) Report, supra note 95, 6.229, at 59.
133. Id. at 1 6.266, at 67.
134. Id. at 16.271, at 68.
135. See supra text accompanying note 79.
136. TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 7.
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copyright owner both indicate that a proper balance in copyright law
should be reached.'37 However, such a balance only becomes possible
if the justifiability of the authors' interests and users are examined.
Further, "a balance between the author's and the public's concerns
must be found."'" This balancing of interests fulfills one of the
objectives of TRIPS and serves the public interest by remaining
attentive to the needs of individual rights-holders and groups within
society.1"
Such a reading of the three-step inquiry in Article 13 is not a
novel proposition. By analogy, the Patents Report DSB invoked
Article 30 of the TRIPS agreement, which forbids unreasonable
prejudice to "the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking
account of the legitimate interests of third parties."l4' In the same
report, Canada also argued that general societal interests also fell
"within the ambit of the term 'third parties' and should also be
considered.'42 This weighing of multiple parties' interests comports
with the wording in TRIPS Article 7 and the directive issued in the
Doha Declaration. Moreover, Article 30's version of the three-step
test mirrors the Article 13 version closely, and also provides a strong
reference point on how Article 13 should be interpreted.
Admittedly, not everyone agrees with the analogy between
Article 13 and Article 30. In the Patent Report, Canada argued that
TRIPS' drafters intended each article to operate separately, and
noted that, "[i]f the framers of the TRIPS Agreement had intended
Article 30 to bear the same meaning as Article 13, they would have
used the same words in each provision."14  Canada further argued
that, "[t]he fact that they did use the same language in Article 26.2,
but not in Article 13 . . . was highly significant."'" However, these
contentions examine Articles 13 and 30 in a vacuum, without
considering the underlying values of TRIPS that should be taken into
account. Moreover, Canada's arguments belie the fact that it also
137. SENFTLEBEN, supra note 70, at 230 (authors are one set of rights-holders, but are
by no means the only set considered in this analysis).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 226.
140. TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 7; Geiger et al., supra note 9, at 707, 709.
141. TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 30.
142. See Patent Report, supra note 100, 7.67, at 164.
143. See id. at 77.
144. Id.
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relied heavily on TRIPS' overall objectives and cited Article 7 in the
Panel Report.145
Thus, in the context of web mashups, this means that we would
also look beyond the interests of content owners and providers. We
must also consider the interests of web mashup creators who wish to
create new works, end users, and the interests of the larger society.
When aggregated, the interests of society and other third parties may
outweigh the interests of the rights-holder.
2. The Interests of All Parties Should Involve More than Economic
Interests.
Having established that the third factor involves a weighing of
interests between multiple parties, we then move to identifying
legitimate interests for consideration by both sides. In the 110(5)
Report, the panel tried to view "the exclusive rights conferred by
copyright on their holders" in economic terms.146 However, the panel
also noted, "[t]hat is not to say that legitimate interests are necessarily
limited to this economic value." 14 7 Legitimate interests may take
other forms and may be supported by relevant public policies or other
social norms.148
We have considered several relevant public policies and societal
interests within the course of this discussion.'49 Web mashups may
represent a new way for our citizens to participate in democratic
discussion and debate. Further, web mashups can foster creativity
and promote the goals of free speech. People are starting to use web
mashups to engage with their community and develop their own sense
of personal identity. Thus, several compelling policies exist to
counterbalance the interests of authors and rights-holders in this
three-step inquiry. Interpreted in this light, the third factor presents
the strongest arguments for a possible copyright exception for web
mashups and their creators.
D. Considering the Three-Step Factors Together
The final outcome of this three-step inquiry reveals a surprisingly
balanced distribution of interests. The first factor weighs strongly in
favor of content providers and rights-holders. The size of the web
145. Id. 7.67, at 164.
146. 110(5) Report, supra note 95, $ 6.227, at 58.
147. Id.
148. SENFrLEBEN, supra note 70, at 230.
149. See supra Part II.
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mashup market makes it unlikely that a blanket limitation on a rights-
holder's copyright protections will qualify as a "special case" or
"limited exception" under Article 13 or Article 30.
Meanwhile, the second factor presents compelling arguments for
both sides. On one hand, a rights-holder should not be able to assert
copyright over all new forms of expression. However, rights-holders
should receive some benefit if their content appears in a newly
emerging medium. With web mashups continuing to develop into a
more robust industry, a content provider can make a stronger claim
that a proposed exemption for web mashup creators would hinder his
normal exploitation of his work. The interests for rights-holders and
web mashup creators are equally matched, and could be considered a
tie. However, this is not enough to justify an exemption from
copyright protections. The first two factors weigh favorably for the
rights-holder.
The viability of an exception from copyright protections for web
mashup creators depends heavily on the third factor. The third factor
presents societal interests that touch upon some of our democratic
values and notions of freedom. Such important group interests may
indeed justify a limitation on rights-holders and authors. Whether
these societal factors are enough to issue a limitation in accordance
with the three-step test will vary from country to country, and by
individual. For now, I would argue that there is not quite enough to
justify a full three-step limitation on copyright. While it is a close call,
the first and second factors provide compelling reasons to hold off on
issuing such an exception for now. In the meantime, I imagine that an
exception for amateur web mashup creators and noncommercial web
mashups would survive the three-step inquiry. All three factors of the
test seem to allow for that possibility. However, no matter the
outcome, the three-step test serves as a useful tool for identifying the
relevant parties and interests to consider, and for providing important
thresholds and limits to keep in mind.
Conclusion
In the end, the further development of web mashups may cast
the deciding vote in determining whether a copyright exemption is
proper. If web mashups develop into primarily commercial tools for
consumers, the societal interests mentioned above will likely become
less prominent, and the argument for a "special case" or "limited
exception" may disappear altogether. Meanwhile, authors and rights-
holders may find themselves in a stronger position to assert their
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interests in their work. However, that assessment could change
quickly if web mashups become an essential medium for speech and
expression and an indispensable means of propagating our culture.
Web mashups have not achieved that kind of significance to date, but
perhaps time will tell.
In the larger context, this inquiry suggests that copyright law
cannot rely on its old assumptions. In both the domestic and
international contexts, copyright law must account for more modern
social concerns. It cannot remain focused on its old economic and
utilitarian roots. If we expect copyright law to remain relevant in
today's digital world, we must alter our assumptions regarding what
copyright law is meant to accomplish. This shift in perspective will
likely require us to take an uncomfortable look at some long held
copyright beliefs and maxims. For example, recent debates suggest
that substantive changes or modifications to TRIPS would be
extremely difficult to achieve because reopening the agreement
would subject the agreement's entire contents to scrutiny.'
However, it is preferable to harmonize these provisions now rather
than continue to apply our outdated notions of copyright to our
current digital age. The sooner we embrace such a change in our
domestic and international copyright policies, the more satisfying our
answers for these important questions will become.
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